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CAN CORPUS LINGUISTICS HELP MAKE
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Lawrence M. Solan
I.

A NEW CORPUS OF FOUNDING ERA TEXTS

James Phillips, Daniel Ortner, and Thomas Lee begin their engaging essay,
Corpus Linguistics & OriginalPublic Meaning: A New Tool To Make Originalism
More Empirical,' by pronouncing originalism "the predominant interpretive
methodology for constitutional meaning in American history."' They then
describe and attempt to justify a new tool to improve originalist methodology:
a large corpus of Founding-era documents, representative of a host of genres
available to educated people of that period. As their title suggests, the brand of
originalism they set out to improve is the version at times dubbed "the new
originalism" -an iteration that seeks to construe the Constitution in
accordance with the understanding of the state constitutional convention
members who read its words and heard its supporters at the time.
This brief Essay expresses support for the project, but also focuses on its
limitations in advancing originalist argumentation. While better empirical
tools for determining original public meaning are valuable, they only get us so
far, as a) there may be multiple original public meanings or no clear meaning
that emerges from the corpora; b) we are lacking a coherent theory to justify
when one original public meaning rather than another should be relied upon;
and c) for abstract concepts such as "abridging the freedom of speech," which
we are likely to encounter in the constitutional context, it is unclear whether
the original meaning ought to be interpreted thickly to include specific
examples of the concept or thinly to define only the concept itself.

1.

James

2.

Id.at 21.

3.

See, e.g., Symposium: The New Originalism in ConstitutionalLaw, 82 FoRDHAM L. REV. 371,
371 (2013).

C. Phillips, Daniel M. Ortner & Thomas R. Lee, Corpus Linguistics & OriginalPublic
Meaning: A New Tool To Make OriginalismMore Empirical, 126 YALE L.J. F. 21 (2016).
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The new corpus, COFEA (Corpus of Founding Era American English), will
feature at least ioo million words of text written between 1760 and 1799, taken

from a variety of sources.4 The project will be the third publicly available
research corpus of general American English created by linguistic scholars from
Brigham Young University, supplementing COCA (Corpus of Contemporary
American English) (beginning 199o)s and COHA (Corpus of Historical
American English) (covering 1820 through 1989).6 The goal of this project is to
provide legal theorists with a research tool better able to reveal "original pubic
meaning" than either the Founding-era dictionaries relied upon by legal
scholars and judges today7 or the even less reliable practice of extrapolating
from a small sample of instances of a word or phrase's usage.
The argument that the new corpus will improve originalist methodology is
straightforward: if scholars want to investigate how the public likely
understood the Constitution's words, then scholars would benefit from
examining the data contained in a large corpus of English from that era rather
than only examining the snapshot that a lexicographer took-a method for
which Justice Scalia's originalism received substantial criticism." Furthermore,
COFEA will likely come with its own software that permits not only searches
of individual words, but also searches of words that co-occur in proximity to
one another.9 This tool makes it possible to take into account syntactic and
semantic structures larger than single words.

4.

Phillips, Ortner & Lee, supra note 1, at 31.

5.

THE CORPUS OF CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN ENGLISH, BYU, http://corpus.byu.edu/coca/
[https://perma.cc/6JIV-QLPH].

6

THE

CORPUS

OF

HISTORICAL

AMERICAN

ENGLISH,

BYU,

http://corpus.byu.edu/coha/

[https://perma.cc/5HPR-FTNU].
7.

See Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise Guide To Using Dictionariesfrom the Founding Era To
Determine the OriginalMeaning of the Constitution, 82 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 358 (2014).

8.

See Phillip A. Rubin, Note, War of the Words: How Courts Can Use Dictionaries Consistent
with Textualist Principles, 6o DUKE L.J. 167, 200-06 (2010). As Phillip Rubin observes,
"Justice Scalia chose definitions (that 'arms' means any kind of weapon, and that 'keep
arms' means to have such weapons) and invoked the dictionary to say that those meanings
were correct because the dictionary contained them. But the extent of what a dictionary can
be used to say about the matter is that the words could have the meanings Justice Scalia
attributed to them- not that they must have those meanings in a given context." Id. at 202.

9.

These are the tools available as part of COCA and COHA, COFEA's sister corpora. See THE
CORPUS OF CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN ENGLISH, supra note 5; THE CORPUS OF HISTORICAL
AMERICAN ENGLISH, supra note 6. Moreover, apart from the BYU corpora, the field of

corpus linguistics has developed a host of tools designed specifically to make such tasks
possible with either corpora that have already been developed by linguists and other
scholars, or with corpora developed by scholars for particular research projects. See, e.g.,
TONY McENERY, RICHARD XIAO & YUKIO TONO, CORPUS-BASED LANGUAGE STUDIES: AN
ADVANCED RESOURCE BOOK (2006); GRAEME KENNEDY, AN INTRODUCTION TO CORPUS
LINGUISTICS (1998).

THE YALE LAW JOURNAL FORUM

May 27, 2016

Moreover, as the Essay's authors argue, judges infer meaning from corpora
even now. In his majority opinion in Muscarello v. United States,o Justice Breyer
surveyed literature, the Bible, and contemporary newspapers to determine the
ordinary meaning of the word "carry."" Judge Posner, in his Seventh Circuit
opinion in United States v. Costello," used Google searches to demonstrate that
the verb "to harbor" had a meaning narrower than "to house." Finally, one of
the authors, Utah Supreme Court Associate Chief Justice Lee, used COCA as a
tool to determine the ordinary meaning of "discharge" in his concurring
opinion in State v. Rasabout.3
If judges are already using various corpora to determine a word's ordinary
meaning in the context of statutory interpretation, the authors argue, then
scholars should develop a corpus with accompanying tools so that the task can
be accomplished at a higher level of precision and professionalism. The authors
are correct on this point. Whatever one's commitment to new originalism, its
proponents have every reason to develop its methods to enhance the empirical
basis of claims that one interpretation of the Constitution better effectuates its
original public meaning than another. Moreover, like dictionaries, the corpus is
neutral in the sense that those whose writing contributes to it had no agenda
with respect to the constitutional debates that occur now, some 250 years after
the texts were written. For these reasons, COFEA is a promising tool.
II. THE CORPUS AS SOURCE MATERIAL FOR A FOREIGN

LANGUAGE

DICTIONARY

Yet a tool is only a tool, and the authors acknowledge some of COFEA's
limitations. First, the authors acknowledge that a general corpus is not very
helpful when defining legal terms of art.4 For these terms, legal sources are
superior. Second, even after using the corpus, originalists must still exercise
judgment to determine how the various occurrences of words or phrases
should inform their meaning in the Constitution. 5 Third, and most
importantly, the authors recognize that originalism is under-theorized in the

10.

524 U.S. 125 (1998).

n1.

Id. at 129-30. The fact of this effort is more impressive than its execution. For criticism from
the perspective of a corpus linguist/practicing lawyer, see Stephen C. Mouritsen, The
Dictionary Is Not a Fortress: Definitional Fallacies and a Corpus-Based Approach to Plain
Meaning, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1915.

12.

666 F- 3 d 1040, 1044 (7 th Cir. 2012).

13.

356 P- 3d 1258, 1281-82 (Utah 2015) (Lee, J., concurring).

14.

Phillips et al., supra note 1, at 29.

15.

Id. at 30
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sense that it typically chooses the most typical meaning as the target but does
not adequately defend that choice. 6
The second and third caveats are closely related and merit further
discussion. The words and phrases used during the Founding do not
necessarily have the same meaning that they have today, just as the meanings
of the words in Shakespeare's plays are not always the same as the meanings of
those same words today. Otherwise, there would be no reason to resort to
earlier texts. We could instead use COCA, or Webster's Third New International
Dictionary. Of course, we may discover in our research that eighteenth-century
English and twenty-first-century English have a lot of vocabulary in common.
Scholars must first assume, however, that the meanings of words may have
changed over time.
Lawrence Solum, a leading theorist of new originalism, makes this point in
his description of the originalist method:
If we want to know what a text means and the text was not written very
recently, we need to be aware of the possibility that it uses language
somewhat differently than we do now. Moreover, meaning is in part a
function of context - and context is time-bound. So if we want to know
what a text means, we need to investigate the context in which the text
was produced. 17
A nuanced way to approach the problem is to become lexicographers of the
moment, constructing definitions from a large corpus of this foreign language,
using the tools of corpus linguistics to determine which terms are typically
used together, which senses of a word predominate, and so on. Professor
Lawrence Lessig has argued for a translator's perspective to be taken generally
in constitutional interpretation.' In fact, the claim that the Constitution was
written and discussed in a foreign language is not as remote from the truth as it
may at first appear. Versions were circulated in both German and Dutch, and
comparison of those versions to the English version can be instructive when it
comes to understanding what the drafters intended.19 However, as Jack Balkin

16.

Id. The authors add a fourth caveat-that corpora currently available to researchers do not

adequately represent Founding-era documents. However, COFEA is intended to solve that
problem, so I do not discuss it further.
17.

Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact in OriginalMeaning, 91
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 20 (2015).

18.

See Lawrence

Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165, 1189 (1993)
("[T]ranslation is a practice that neutralizes the effect of changed language on a text's
meaning, where language is just one part of context, and changed language is just one kind
of change in context.").

ig.

See Christina Mulligan et al., Founding Era Translations of the Constitution, 31 CONST.
COMMENT. 1 (2016).

6o
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points out,20 whether one is deciding what to make of the Dutch and German
versions or what to make of differences in English between the Founding era
and today, interpretive decisions must be made, and these decisions are by no
means theoretically neutral. Let us focus on some of them.
First, lexicography is not cut and dried. Lexicographers must make many
kinds of judgments. How many tokens of a word or senses of a word must be
present before one can responsibly infer a definition?" What if there are too
many tokens so that some kind of sampling procedure is needed to make sense
of the data without losing one's sense of neutrality?' What happens if a word
or a sense of a word appears disproportionally in one sort of document but not
in others? To what extent are examples expansions of the same sense, or
entirely different senses?' Lexicographers must make all of these judgments
and many more.
Second, the decision to assign a word its ordinary meaning rather than a
more expansive meaning is a substantive decision with significant interpretive
consequences. Assume that the corpus reveals that the phrase "bear arms" was
more often than not used in military contexts, but was not restricted to military
contexts. What then? Should the interpreter prefer the phrase's narrower,
ordinary meaning and limit the Second Amendment's protections to the
military context? Should the interpreter prefer the phrase's broader meaning
and extend Second Amendment protections to the home? The corpus does not
help resolve this interpretive dilemma. Of course, it is better to know these
facts than to infer them from less robust data. However, once one commits to
original public meaning as a principle of construction, one discovers that there
are many original public meanings of an expression, and the corpus does not
provide much help in selecting among them. Recent debates over the meaning
of "commerce" in the Constitution illustrate the problem.25
20.

JackM. Balkin, The Constructionof OriginalPublicMeaning, 31 CONST. COMMENT. 73 (2o16).

21.

See, e.g., SIDNEY I. LANDAU, DICTIONARIES: THE ART AND CRAFT OF LEXICOGRAPHY 296 (2d
ed. 2001).

22.

Id.

23.

Lexicographers

speak of "representativeness." See Bo SVENSEN, A HANDBOOK OF
LEXICOGRAPHY: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF DICTIONARY-MAKING 64 (2009). As linguist
Kevin Tang has pointed out to me in personal communication, the word "asparagus" may
appear too times in a corpus if the corpus contains ten cookbooks, but that is not the same
as a word that appears the same number of times but that is more evenly distributed among
genres. Corpus linguists have developed computational tools to adjust for these differences
in dispersion among words equally represented in a corpus. See, e.g., Stefan Th. Gries,
Dispersionsand Adjusted Frequenciesin Corpora, 13 INT'LJ. CORPUS LINGUISTICS 403 (2008).

24.

See LANDAU, supra note 21, at 337-38; Christian M. Meyer & Iryna Gurevych, Wiktionary: A
New Rival for Expert-Built Lexicons? Exploring the Possibilities of Collaborative Lexicography, in
ELECTRONIC LEXICOGRAPHY 259, 283-89 (Sylviane Granger & Magali Paquot eds., 2012).

25.

See Randy Barnett, The OriginalMeaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REv. tot
(2001) (arguing for a narrow reading based on an analysis of Founding-era documents);
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We see analogous problems in the application of the "ordinary meaning
rule" in statutory interpretation. Consider Chisom v. Roemer,26 a 1991 Supreme
Court case interpreting the Voting Rights Act. In Louisiana, state supreme
court justices are elected.' Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act applies to the
election of "representatives.""2 The plaintiffs argued that Louisiana's at-large
election structure for electing justices violated the Act. 29 The defendants argued
that the Act did not apply to the election of judges, since judges are not
representatives.30 The case made its way to the U.S. Supreme Court, where a
majority of Justices held that the Act did apply, relying both on the law's
purpose and on its stated goal of overriding a Supreme Court precedent that
had construed the Voting Rights Act narrowly. In dissent, Justice Scalia
sharply criticized the majority for not adhering to the ordinary meaning rule. 2
As a linguistic matter, Justice Scalia was right. Judges do not come within
the ordinary meaning of "representative." But the majority was also right in its
arguments. There was no reason to believe Congress intended to leave a safe
harbor for racism-infected elections of judges. The case boiled down to
whether ordinary meaning is a good first approximation of what a legislature
intended to communicate, or whether it is a rule of interpretation to be
followed as a matter of stare decisis. If the former, then ordinary meaning is
defeasible if more specific historical and contextual information suggests that
the legislature intended a broader interpretation. If the latter, it is not.
With or without a corpus, originalism presents the same problem as did
the Voting Rights Act. There will always be lexicographic decisions to be made
about how narrowly or broadly to define a term. These decisions are not
neutral. The lexicographer will take into account the dictionary's purpose,
audience, and financial resources that may limit the length of permissible
definitions. The constitutional interpreter will take into account prior
commitments to what counts as a legitimate argument, and will also have to
decide the circumstances, if any, under which the ordinary sense of a term can
be overridden, leading to a more expansive understanding, if individual

Jack Balkin, Commerce, 1o9 MICH. L. REv. 1, 15-29 (2010) (arguing for a broad reading based
on a combination of structure, usage, and dictionary definitions); Robert G. Natelson,
Commerce in the Commerce Clause: A Response to Jack Balkin, 109 MICH. L. REv. FIRST
IMPRESSIONS 55 (2010) (arguing that Balldn focuses excessively on evidence that supports a
broad interpretation, missing the fact that a narrow reading follows from ordinary usage).
26.

501 U.S. 380 (1991).

27.

La. Const., Art. 5,

28.

52

29.

Chisom, 501 U.S. at 385.

U.S.C.

§

22(A).

§ 1o301(b)

(1982).

30. Id. at 398-99.
31.

Id. at 403-04.

32.

Id. at 405 (Scalia,
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J.,

dissenting).
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inquiry into the social history of the time suggests that such a move is more
likely to be faithful to the intent of the Framers and how they were
understood. Nothing in the corpus, or in the methods of corpus-driven
lexicography, demands one result or another.
Third, a thorny semantic problem appears to be impervious to the
introduction of corpus linguistics into constitutional analysis: To what extent
does the meaning of a word include an understanding of the members of the
category that the word denotes? Put differently, does the meaning of an
abstract concept include concrete instantiations? Dictionaries differ in their
commitment to considering examples as part of a definition.
In the
constitutional realm, the issue arises, for example, in deciding whether the
3
Eighth Amendment's prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishments"s
should include at least a partial list of acceptable and unacceptable
punishments at the time of the Founding, or whether it should be understood
abstractly, meaning something like "punishment harsher than acceptable
norms would permit."
Lawrence Solum takes the position that interpretation should in this sense
be thin, noting that "the facts to which the text can be applied change over
time." 6 Jack Balkin, whose "living originalism" espouses thin interpretation
more generally in order to be at once faithful to the Founders and responsive to
change, agrees.3 1 Others who do not subscribe to originalism share the view
that the meanings of constitutional terms should not include Founding-era
understandings of what came within the concept and what did not. 8 Yet
Scalia's arguments supporting the constitutionality of the death penalty today
is replete with reference to its ubiquity in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries. 39 The problem is a linguistic one: words or phrases describing a

33.

See Jan Bartrum, Two Dogmas of Originalism, 7 WASH. U. JURISPRUDENCE REV. 157 (2015)
(arguing that judges should not prioritize fixing the text's semantic meaning in a historical
moment nor allow a text's fixed semantic meaning to constrain the construction of legal
rules); Jonathan Gienapp, Historicism and Holism: Failures of Originalist Translation, 84
FORDHAM L. REv. 935 (2015) (arguing that originalism needs a better grounding in the
historical method to properly ascertain true original meaning and avoid atomistic
translation).

34.

See SVENSEN, supra note

35.

U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.

23,

36.

Solum, supra note 17, at 21.

37.

JACK M.

at 281-88.

BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 6-7,100-101 (2011).

38. See, e.g., Robert W. Bennett, Originalismand the Living American Constitution, in ROBERT W.
BENNETT & LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM: A DEBATE 78 (2011).

39. See Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 46 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997); Antonin Scalia, Response, in A
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAw 132, 145-46; see also Baze v.
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category may be understood either abstractly or as a function of the category's
members. The solution, however, is not linguistic at all. Rather, it requires a
decision as to how responsive constitutional interpretation should be to
changes in political and social norms over time.
CONCLUSION

The Founding-era corpus project is a good one. It will reduce the reliance
on eighteenth- and nineteenth-century dictionaries and the temptation to select
among them strategically. Moreover, by making some of the tools of corpus
linguistic analysis available to the community of constitutional scholars, the
new corpus will encourage analysts to look not only at the single word, but also
at the linguistic context in which the word occurs. All of this should bring the
practice of originalist analysis closer to its goal of discovering original public
meaning.
But perhaps not much closer in many instances. Like the lexicographer,
the originalist, having found either too few or too many instances of a word in
the corpus, will have to decide what constitutes original public meaning. And
like the lexicographer, the originalist will have other choices to make about
how narrowly or broadly, thinly or thickly, to construe a relevant word. These
choices are not strictly linguistic. They depend upon the commitments of the
corpus's user, and these commitments depend upon the user's stance with
respect to the language being analyzed.
Still, at the end of the day, it is hard to imagine that this wealth of new
information will fail to add value to constitutional discourse. At the very least,
the corpus will likely provide sufficiently rich new information to generate
healthy, open debate about what constitutes good constitutional analysis.
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